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JOSEPH LICHTENBERG, M.D.

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## The Superego—A Vital or Supplanted Concept?

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# Guilt, Shame, Disobedience: Social Regulatory Mechanisms and the “Inner Normative System”

DIRK FABRICIUS, PH.D.

The author, a criminologist, describes a metadisciplinary guilt conception that combines elements of psychoanalysis, psychology of moral judgment, and evolutionary psychology.

## *The Criminological Perspective*

ALTHOUGH IN THE STATES OF THE WESTERN CHRISTIAN WORLD, guilt is understood as an essential element of criminal law, the bridges between psychoanalysis and criminal law have never been solidly built and are partly broken down again.<sup>1</sup> At the same time, psychoanalysis is the only psychology capable of conceptualizing moral autonomy, thanks to the construction of a superego. Guilt is

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<sup>1</sup>Aichhorn (1925), Alexander and Staub (1929), Reiwald (1948), Redl and Wineman (1951), Spitz (1958), Parin (1959, 1978), Sandler (1960), Goudsmit (1962), Lampl-de Groot (1962), Lineke (1969), Grunberger (1972), Devereux (1974), Engelhardt (1976), Haflke (1976, 1980), Cremerius (1977), Reinke (1977, 1987, 1997; Reinke and Toussaint, 1982), Binswanger (1978), Jäger (1978, 1980), T. Vogt (1978), Streng (1980), Winnicott (1984, 1994), Wurmser (1987), Koehn (1992), Richter (1994), Duncan (1996), Lichtenberg, Lachmann, and Fosshage (1996), Schild (1996), Hirsch (1997), Rauchfleisch (1999), Gruen (2000).

inseparably connected with the idea of inner autonomy—the ability to decide what is right or wrong.<sup>2</sup>

The theses of this paper<sup>3</sup> are that the “guilt” mechanism is the relatively most effective mechanism for preventing crimes in the long run; that punishment and criminal law often act in “decivilizing” and nonspecific ways and impair the work of the guilt mechanism; and that, to make the guilt mechanism more effective in culture and civilization, individuals need a developed “inner normative system,” and the respective civilization must contain many elements of democratic and republican participation.

The idea that the superego stems mainly from “identification with the aggressor” is outdated. Autonomously developing precursors of the superego imply that its development is not only promoted but also disturbed by sociocultural influences. Freud’s superego concept already was based on the experience that humans, particularly men, are capable of barbarous, terrible, “psychopathic” behavior, especially during war. But the assumption of a death drive has been more or less given up (Krause, 2001, p. 936; R. Vogt, 2001). There is more evidence that sadism, cruelty, and psychopathy are caused by early childhood experiences, particularly traumatization. The defense mechanism “identification with the aggressor” proved itself to be rather detrimental for a humane, civilized superego.

Psychoanalysis shows that allowing “bad feelings” in one’s thinking helps to refrain from “bad deeds” and to find socially acceptable forms of regulation instead. Aggression, rage, and envy are functional for the individual and for the community and society. The transition to criminality does not happen with the emergence of these feelings but by the way they determine ensuing acts.<sup>4</sup> To assume a genetic

<sup>2</sup>Except psychoanalysis, only the Kohlberg school is relevant to understanding development of moral judgment in connection with an empirical entrance to the question of guilt (see Kohlberg and Turiel, 1971; Kohlberg, Scharf, and Hickey, 1972; Kohlberg, Wassermann, and Richardson, 1975; Gilligan, 1984, 1987; Gilligan, Ward, and McLean, 1988; Kohlberg, 1997).

<sup>3</sup>For a more detailed discussion of the relations among law, psychoanalysis, and the psychology of moral judgment, see Fabricius (1993, 1996).

<sup>4</sup>It is astonishing that some psychoanalysts do not follow their own research results when so-called criminals enter the stage; they suddenly seem to work with another category of humans, who allegedly can be treated only with punishment (cf., surprisingly, Kernberg, 2001).

disposition for superego mechanisms necessarily means that conflicts exist in the human being.

Further progress in discussion of the superego concept occurred with distinguishing shame from guilt and with the discovery of the “shame–guilt dilemma.”<sup>5</sup> The “obedience mechanism,” on the other hand, does not seem to have its due place yet.

Last, the word *superego* is misleading because it implies a clear hierarchy that neither exists nor would be desirable because of the danger of absoluteness. I see inner structure in the sense of a separation of powers that—with different functions but not organized hierarchically—work optimally together to achieve a lasting improvement in quality of life. Regarding the justice system and a democratic principle of lawfulness, the superego concept needs to be unfolded further. One question is whether a law or a rule is a “just” or a “right” one. This question obviously arises not only in connection with the legal takeover of Germany by the National Socialists in 1933 but also in connection with an “international criminal court.”<sup>6</sup> The citizen in a state based on democratic law needs criteria to discriminate between just and unjust laws and rules of procedure. The citizen cannot obtain these criteria by counting on the equipment given to him by nature or by that acquired in the primary socialization of early childhood alone; more cognitive work is presupposed. In addition, the justice of a single law often remains questionable. In these cases, legitimation of the law is based on a democratic decision that works only if citizens are also convinced that this kind of decision making is right. This demands far more of the functioning superego in a republican democracy.

Last, the difference between the focus of the criminal scientist and that of the psychoanalytic therapist must be emphasized. Although everyone has had feelings of guilt and has fantasized committing crimes—things that psychoanalysis has to deal with again and

<sup>5</sup>Wurmsser (1981, 1989). Cognitive psychology can be agreed with, stating the difference between conventional and postconventional norms, and also with the philosophical distinction between good and right.

<sup>6</sup>Article 20 of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany states a difference between *Recht und Gesetz*, binding the judges to both, so emphasizing the difference between legality and legitimacy. This distinction perhaps is clearer for the European continental legal system, which relies on written constitution and law, than for common law systems, but precedents are necessarily

again—the transition to real crimes that cause guilt is less the object of psychoanalytic work. But “it ain’t necessarily so.”

### *The Inner Normative System*

Instead of *superego*, I speak of the *inner normative system*, because there are multiple normative orientations. These may form a coalition, but more often they stand in conflict with one another. In addition to “moral dilemmas” and the “shame–guilt dilemma,” there may be other dilemmas.

Feelings of guilt are related to a social object or a social relationship and contribute to recognition and regulation. Because it is a social mechanism, its successful course is connected to the coordination of several people. This also applies vice versa for the other mechanisms.

### *What Is Guilt? Feelings of Guilt Show the Way*

Anxiety signals danger, and pain points to injury or illness. All feelings serve as orientation and refer to an object. Feelings can be mistaken; that is, there may be anxiety without danger, or there may be danger without fear.

When feelings become too intense, they may become incapacitating, as in the case of panic. Feelings that have lost their object of reference may become tormenting—for example, anxieties or feelings of guilt, the reasons for which may be hidden in fog.

Feelings of guilt tell us that we have hurt someone and cause us both to avoid revenge and to render compensation.

One can subject feelings of guilt to a reality examination: Is the feeling measured against the severity of the incurred guilt too intense or too weak? Thanks to such reality testing, feelings of guilt can develop into consciousness of guilt or “guilt insight” (cf. Pàramo-Ortega, 1985).

The sense of guilt can contribute to social cohesion by integrating the guilty person into the community. Without feelings of guilt, one cannot understand that one has caused sorrow. If people did not develop feelings of guilt, there would be no effective brake against the

escalation of force and aggression. When guilt remains untreated, wounds heal badly. The revenge wishes, resentment, and anger of those who are hurt, combined with the fear and preventive aggression of the perpetrators, can easily lead to a continuation of the perpetrator–victim–pursuer cycle with its destructive consequences.

To put this more abstractly, guilt signifies a complex relation—a relationship between at least two people—in which a perpetrator causes pain, damage, and hurt, despite there being an alternative way of acting.

Love is also a complex relation. I may be infatuated one-sidedly, as I may feel guilty one-sidedly. But love itself presupposes reciprocity and therefore does not really exist without mutual emotional processes. Partners in a relationship must be involved with their emotions, but love or guilt does not exist inside them but between them. Dominance and dependence are other examples of such social relations.

By this definition, guilt is not necessarily consciously perceived by the perpetrator, the victim, or anyone else. Some illnesses do not cause any pain and thus develop unimpeded; likewise, guilt may be imperceptible. This too has negative consequences, because the relation between the perpetrator and the injured remains imbalanced.

Perceiving guilt, realistically weighing it, and triggering an action program may also be blocked by defensive processes such as denial and projection. When such defense is supported socially or institutionally it is particularly effective, and the consequences are especially explosive—for instance, decorating soldiers who have killed their enemies or conferring honors on public prosecutors who have obtained many death sentences.<sup>7</sup>

### *Guilt Does Not Presuppose Freedom of Will*

The concept of guilt does not presuppose that perpetrators might have acted differently had they only wanted to. Consciousness of guilt works prospectively—triggers considerations of how to produce a balance in the respective relation.

<sup>7</sup>For “institutional defense mechanisms,” see Mentzos (1976) and Erdheim (1982).

Psychoanalysis allows autonomy to grow and to extend freedom of choice. Gaining insight into guilt may allow a person to avoid engaging in the same act or in a similar act in the future. After Darwin and Freud, one cannot presuppose freedom of will any longer, as Kant could do. We have the chance to free ourselves from our original biologically determined mental immaturity by learning and by reflecting on experience. Liberty is a product of socialization.

### *Guilt as Social Regulatory Mechanism*

Evolutionary psychology suggests a combination of perception, motivation, and behavior in the description of a mechanism (Barkow, Cosmides, and Tooby, 1992). With regard to perception, indispensable parts of the guilt mechanism are perception of someone else's pain, keeping of a record of the event, evaluation of one's contribution to the event, and history of the relationship. This perception basis allows evaluation of feelings toward the other person. Perception and evaluation of the relationship are done both by the perpetrator and by the injured. The perpetrator is ready and motivated to offer compensation, and the injured accepts the compensation. If these actions can be coordinated, there is a chance for normalization of the relation through compensation and reconciliation, which make cooperation possible again. Acknowledgment of guilt is the result of such reflection and indicates the status of the relationship, which changed through one's own participation and which one wants to help repair. This example represents the ideal type. In reality, the process may be inhibited or broken off.

### *Other Social Regulatory Mechanisms and Their Relations to Guilt*

It is important to distinguish the guilt mechanism from other mechanisms. They all can overlap and reinforce one another. This happens, for example, when disobedience is coupled with injury to the person to whom one owes obedience. That the different mechanisms can conflict with one another makes it obvious that the difference between them must be clearly defined. Dilemmas arise. The concept of

social regulatory mechanisms implies that there exists a programmed sequence of steps. Furthermore, this sequence always depends on the reaction of the opposite side (as well as on other factors) for its unfolding and continuation. The steps of this mechanism are not necessarily performed in each case; among other things, there may be a petering out or a change in direction.

Second, the concept of social regulatory mechanisms means that the mechanism aims at reaching a state of social balance. This balance, in turn, presupposes that a certain "calming" also occurs in the individuals.

### *Obedience Mechanism*

When this mechanism is triggered by a certain behavior, an already existing though asymmetrical relationship must be presupposed. "Conformity" and "loyalty" also presuppose a relationship, but this one can be symmetrical. The "disobedient" person gains a certain amount of autonomy and liberty.

The "norms" are orders, commandments, and prohibitions that may seem to be without meaning. Especially senseless orders uncover the disobedient person, who likes to ask for sense. Orders must be given explicitly; the obedient behavior is not understandable in and of itself. The typical reaction of the person who requires obedience and notices disobedience is annoyance and anger, whereas the disobedient person begins fearing persecution and punishment. The disobedient person denies the deed and flees; he is confronted by the need to choose between submission or rebellion. Generally, punishment and reproach are demonstratively proclaimed and performed. For this mechanism to function within a social setting, such as the family or a school, it is necessary to have spectators who identify with the punisher. Presence of spectators strengthens the effect of the punishment through social pressure.

"Degradation" is usually connected with punishment. If degradation is carried out, it stabilizes the situation, because fear of being treated similarly effectively controls the behavior of spectators. The ensuing desolidarization with the punished person reinforces the fear. However, the situation attained with punishment (and complementarily with reward and honoring) remains in unstable

balance because demands for obedience in themselves may incite rebellion. Typical effects in the punished person are that he or she, driven by "blind obedience," forfeits responsibility and becomes readier to obey. At the same time, the punished person's tendency to become aggressive increases, and he or she in turn directs this aggression against his or her subordinates. Surrendering responsibility also leads to "narcotization of conscience." Persons who have escaped (this time) feel indirectly honored, promoted, and classified as good.

### *Reprisal*

Retribution and revenge restore some symmetry. There is no need for any previous relationship; the injury creates the relationship.

Noticing that a person has been hurt does not require any learned or known norms. The physically hurt person—whose resources are withdrawn, whose freedom of movement is restricted, who has been coerced or raped—usually knows this "automatically."<sup>8</sup> If anything is learned, it is that there are certain kinds of damages that have to be accepted as "normal" (e.g., parental corporal punishment, military drill).

The norms are rather "declarative" and give word to injustice, whereas conventions and orders are contingent on content and vary significantly depending on group, culture, and society.

Encroachment, injury, and damage are answered with a mixture of rage and fear. There is in any case a desire to fight back, which would result in not only the restitution of resources and the restitution of self-esteem but also social regulation.

An individual incapable of reprisal quickly becomes the victim of exploiters and slave drivers. One must be furious to be capable of

<sup>8</sup>When damages are caused indirectly or have built up gradually or slowly, cognitive processes become more necessary. Registering an injury, damage, or liberty impairment is difficult enough; lacking such cognitions makes finding the feelings necessary for the defense even more so. For example, a person who buys and eats meat spoiled with bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) may become ill years later, when it will be almost impossible to reconstruct the chain of causes. Similar are cases in which medications have harmful side effects and the victims do not know the cause until much later.

successful retribution. Fury is needed to overcome the anxiety and ready oneself for action. The perpetrator—having come to his senses, so to speak—is afraid of the wronged person's rage and of prosecution and tries to avoid both. Being capable of reprisal, however, is indispensable for social balance (Axelrod, 1984). In the long run, it is very disturbing for the social setting if there are too many "sheep."

The result of successful reprisal is satisfaction signaling restoration of impaired self-esteem, then a cooling down, and, finally, if the perpetrator is in a corresponding mood, acceptance and a mutual feeling of being finished. Forced restoration of balance, on the other hand, has destructive effects, because an "eye for an eye" damages both eyes; often, both parties become impaired. Furthermore, if one party seeks revenge (two eyes for an eye), the retribution mechanism tends to produce positive feedback. This vicious circle, which can be seen in decaying systems of "blood feud," is also expensive, takes time, uses up other resources, frays nerves, and is not favorable for a social and cooperative climate.

One can avoid the disadvantages of the "reprisal strategy" by using the "guilt mechanism." Its inherent aim is restoration of balance in the sense of compensation by work and by emotional restitution—obtaining of "vision aid." The starting point is the same as for the "reprisal"—namely, injury or damage. The trigger for choosing the compensation strategy is something like "love"—an idea, a notion, that the relationship might be restored. The tendency to denial and flight is restricted or replaced by one of careful approach. The mechanism can continue if there is a corresponding readiness for re-approach by the victim. Instead of there being two exhausted opponents who can hardly move after injury and counterinjury, there are two who have found compensation for damages as much as possible and who have "rebuilt" themselves.

So, seen from an economic point of view, fewer resources are destroyed and frittered away. One can look into the other's eyes without fear but also without the urge "to give him a black eye."

However, this strategy requires not only readiness but also actual resources of the perpetrator. Although one can knock out the eye of a perpetrator who "hasn't got a penny in his pockets," one cannot get compensation from him if he does not have corresponding resources or at least is fit for work.

### *Conformity and Shame*

Here we usually but not necessarily have to deal with a preceding relation. For instance, in a community, Everyone's reaction is triggered by divergent behavior of a member of the community.

Provided the rule breaker is conscious of the respective requests for conformity, he wants to let himself go and to let "feelings run free," without considering conventions.

Either an innocent mistake or simple unconformity and strangeness can trigger this reaction. Because of the large cultural and social variance in customs, what is regarded as very appropriate in one community is regarded as "absolutely impossible" and forbidden in another.

Unlike orders, such customs can develop automatically, without the affected persons being aware of them. Therefore, the corresponding norms also can be implicit, must never be formally adopted, and frequently escape criticism, because they are not perceived at all.<sup>9</sup> Sometimes one can recognize membership by becoming aware of implicit rules that one cannot look up or study: People who do not come out of a "good stable" cannot behave correctly, are recognized as not belonging, and are picked out from the start.

Unconformity, strangeness, and deviation can trigger fear and uncertainty in Everyone. This leads to rejection and possibly to contempt.

The distinction between guilt and shame seems to be physiologically based because, whereas shame causes blushing, guilt is more connected with paling. Whereas guilt represents a regulatory principle after the transgression of another's boundary, shame secures the observation and preservation of the borders of one's own self. The injury of another also can produce shame; however, this is not necessarily so.

The "shame complex" is connected with many feelings still to be differentiated (stage fright, disgrace, embarrassment; Neckel, 1991). Typically, the tendency to act from shame means that one wants to leave the field, to disappear, to flee to the "mouse hole." The response of others is often scorn; mockery and exclusion follow.

<sup>9</sup>The "values made to body" (Bourdieu, 1972).

"Progressive" ways out also exist, if for instance customs and practices are questioned and the readiness to tolerate deviation grows. Conformity expectations are reinforced by excluding deviants. Such expectations often serve social oppression, are usually protected, and are not usually reversible by defense mechanisms in the psychoanalytic sense. The greater the conformity pressure, the greater also becomes fear, "readiness to sacrifice oneself," and hindrance of aggression. To give way to the conformity pressure means to restrict the room for social insight at the same time and to radicalize the conformity expectations. Conformity pressure restricts creativity and impairs the possibilities of the individuals to adapt themselves to changed surroundings.

As "headstrongness" or "obstinance"<sup>10</sup> is apparently nature's gift, the balance also remains unstable in a society marked by conformity pressure. All concepts that require conformity and training cannot distinguish between criminal and divergent behavior. As we depend on the security to belong, on support, and on partners to talk with, the tendency to do without obstinacy in favor of membership therefore is always preserved. Balance between obstinacy and the "public spirit" can easily be disturbed by socialization and lead to imbalances.

### *Loyalty*

The loyalty pattern is related to the pressure to conform. Here a specific group pressure works, especially so with regard to "fine differences" (Bourdieu, 1979). These differences distinguish the members of institutions, certain families, and certain societies from others and are needed (or are thought to be needed) for economic and social reproduction, for individual identity, and so on. "Dog does not eat dog" behavior and esprit de corps are prominent examples. The point is that it is the honorable "behavior," "befitting social standing" in its narrower meaning, that makes a professional group, a definite class, a definite "estate," an outstanding, excellent one.

<sup>10</sup>The German *Eigensinn* covers both meanings (see Hesse, 1919; Pfefferer-Wolf, 2001).

Essentially, this mechanism is similar to the conformity mechanism. However, because it is about graduation and hierarchy formation too, and because this pattern appears particularly in hierarchical organizations, conformity and obedience are mixed.

The "boss" is also subject to this loyalty toward the institution or organization. From this perspective, it is possible that the boss is a traitor. Honorable presidents and directors are under special pressure to defend their institutions against the outside world, to cover the behavior of their employees, and so on. Betrayal is the prototype of behavior that triggers persecution here. The norms are frequently implicit and need not be formally stated because the morals (e.g., promoting health, justice) contradict these norms more or less openly. Typical reactions are indignation and contempt toward the traitor, refusal of information, and a tendency to exclude the traitor and move him into an unimportant position. The effect of basing an institution on the loyal behavior of its members is that the organization can dominate or exploit its environment or that it can resist similar strategies of "opposing groups" even better.

There is a cost to producing and maintaining this type of loyalty. Loyalty often requires an expensive façade, a positive image, because actual inside results are declining and because, given the lack of freedom of opinion and publicity, improvement in quality by positive feedback cannot be achieved. Insofar as the attainable balance is unstable and work worsens, "betrayal" and disloyalty must be expected (Hirschman, 1974, 1996, p. 19 ff.).

### *Convergence and Divergence of the Mechanisms*

How can the hypothesis that these are separate mechanisms be justified? The first "proof" is that these mechanisms can conflict with one another. Demands of innocence, conformity, and obedience are often divergent.

The bank robber disobeys the law (a state order), causes damage, and deviates from social norms.

But the Milgram (1974) experiments demonstrated the conflict between obedience demands and remaining innocent, as was the case with crimes committed during the time of National Socialism.

Milgram test subjects who obeyed the orders or demands of the authority against their conscience showed physiologic signs of stress.

A further type of conflict is sexual activity that is mutually agreed on but socially forbidden. This is a case of doing a mutual favor (opposite of guilt) that is banned. The concept of "sin" contains a socialization program that tends to weld two originally disparate mechanisms together to make people believe that disobedience causes guilt. From a special point of view, this is a "brilliant trick." A similar ingenious idea is to connect forbidden sexuality and knowledge and thus also make knowledge sin (Genesis). If the obedience demands focus on oppression of sexuality and curiosity, then individuals who subject themselves to this obedience demand become guilty toward themselves as well as toward their partners.

Obedience demands and conformity demands may diverge with regard to the growth of guilt, as in the case of rape ordered during war. The opposite is also true: Conflicts can arise between conformity demands and obedience demands. This is true for telling tales to teachers and for providing testimony against relatives. To obey the authority or the law means to be traitorous, to contradict group or family morals. "Theft among comrades," unlike the ordinary "department store theft," is judged to be especially "bad" because here guilt and disloyalty meet.

The employee who blows the whistle on his organization for causing injuries to others is in a conflict between loyalty demands and conscience demands regarding preservation of his innocence.

Furthermore, the field of cognitive psychology, which deals with moral judgment, observes that very young children can distinguish accurately between conventional norms and guilt-related norms, which forbid causing damage, without having been advised or taught the difference between the two (Nunner-Winkler, 1998).

There is some evidence that the distinction between injurious behavior and social norms has its roots in genetic makeup. Justification seems to be needed under every condition in which injury and damage are done to others, whereas conventional norms are not considered to need such justification.

This does make sense because the person who causes damage also impairs social cooperation and thus, so to speak, the "gross national product."



One does not have to learn that one shall not kill and shall not hurt others. The capabilities of social perception encompass the idea of what it means to feel pain and of how an impaired person presumably will react.

Reconciliation rituals can be observed in precultural times and certainly with primates. Both simple resistance and flight are “naturally” occurring. Moreover, there is a tendency within species to reduce injury caused by rivalry and fights over territory. For example, antlers are suitable less as a weapon than as a signal of power and intimidation.

In general, people do not kill, rape, and loot spontaneously. The homogeneity of military education by way of training illustrates the fact that people must be socialized accordingly (Bröckling, 1997). At the same time, the “obligations against one’s own self” must be weakened, as people are not easily convinced of the value of self-sacrifice.

Calculations always determine the choice of one or the other strategy. The same is true regarding the successful or failing course of the regulation mechanism in question. These calculations are functional for the economy of resources and the “household of emotions.”

Admittedly, these calculations reach much further and are more extensive than those that the neoliberal economy with its so-called rational-choice models suggests.

If these considerations are correct, then this manner of nearsighted rationality is virtually “irrational.” It damages the individuals who devote themselves to such a program, and it damages the social community. The farsighted or “enlightened egoist”<sup>11</sup> (some prefer the expression “reciprocal altruist”) shows “public spirit” because he knows that over the long run it will serve his interest more than any attempt to cheat, to deceive, or to suppress others. In any case, one sees the guilt mechanism work only if both sides thereby expect favorable achievement. Whether they use the guilt mechanism also depends on how autonomous they are to admit guilt or to accept another’s acknowledgment of guilt. This presupposes a number of characteristics—a “mature” dealing with feelings, farsightedness, and objective stability. It also presumes that there is respect from part of the society when confronted with these events, as well as the will not to escalate the conflict. The higher the pressure for loyalty and conformity and the higher the obedience demands, the less room there is for the guilt mechanism to work. So, to deem punishment to be the most effective

means of enforcing obedience demands represents an irresolvable contradiction to a successful guilt regulation.

On one hand, an intelligent, rational, and farsighted “cultural program” takes into account the mechanisms already given genetically; on the other hand, such a program supports the effectiveness of these mechanisms by adequate cognitions and corresponding experience possibilities and necessary instruction. It promotes the abilities of individuals to handle guilt because this is most likely to offer the opportunity of hindering guilt-producing actions in the future. This is a very sensitive matter, as indicated by the fact that every psychoanalyst works on feelings of guilt. It is just the abstinence of the analyst from suspicion and accusations that makes this discussion possible (Wurmser, 1987). Anticipating the grant of autonomy contributes to winning it.

But one has to accept that there is no absolute priority of one or another mechanism. The choice always depends on where one can expect to achieve the greatest chances. What one can influence, if necessary, is the existence of chances or risks that can make the choice easier for the individual.

Our culture primarily promotes loyal behavior toward institutions. The individual expects to gain profits from his loyalty—for example, from the “rapacious” behavior of his organization. This can be observed in actual cases of corruption, unfaithfulness, and deceit in cartels, in health services, in planning and building departments, in control offices for drivers’ licenses, and so on. Many people no longer know what they are striving for; this is nothing but a socialization result too, and from some people’s view it is a real “success.”

Many states and many people rely on penal law, on reward and punishment concepts, and thus enforce the “obedience mechanism.” On the international stage, it is not the South African “Truth and Reconciliation Committee” (Tutu, 1999) that is a model for dealing with crimes against human rights—it is an International Criminal Court. If there are successes, they are usually short-lived, and in the long run they are counterbalanced by “unwanted secondary effects”—more violence, more war, and more people traumatized by civil war, terror attacks, and socialization not based on autonomy and insight.

<sup>11</sup>Axelrod (1984, p. 113), Hofstadter (1985, p. 805), Dennett (1995, p. 478), Baurmann (1996, p. 8), Lutz (1997, p. 366), Willke (1997, p. 111).

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